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State Action Immunity and
Antitrust Issues In Cable
Television Franchising
By STEPHEN D. SUSMAN*
MARK L. D. WAWRO**
Probably the single most significant distinguishing feature of an-
titrust litigation involving cable television franchising is that the
franchising process requires action by a legislative body. Typically,
franchises are granted by a municipality or group of municipalities
through legislative actions to one or more cable television system
operators. Antitrust challenges to selection of franchisees involve
plaintiffs in contests not only with private business entities but
also with governmental units such as city councils. This involve-
ment of branches of government in the franchise award process af-
fects the antitrust exposure and liability of successful franchise ap-
plicants due to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and, to a lesser
extent, the state action doctrine first enunciated in Parker v.
Brown.' This article discusses the impact of those doctrines on an-
titrust liability in the context of a cable television franchise award.
I.
State Action Immunity: Parker v. Brown
In Parker v. Brown,' the Supreme Court decided that Califor-
nia's Argricultural Prorate Act,3 under which private producers of
raisins could be ordered to hold their product off the market in
order to raise prices and thereby prevent agricultural waste, was
not pre-empted by the Sherman Act.4 Under the California Act,
the decision to adopt marketing restrictions would be made by a
* Partner, Susman & McGowan, Houston, Texas.
** Associate, Susman & McGowan, Houston, Texas.
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. Id.
3. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, p. 1969.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
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state commission, although the specific restrictions to be imple-
mented would be devised by a committee composed primarily of
raisin producers. The program formulated by the committee of rai-
sin producers was subject to the approval of the state commission,
and thereafter would become effective upon a favorable referen-
dum of raisin producers in the state. Clearly, then, "state action"
immunity has never been limited to anticompetitive programs uni-
laterally imposed by the state. What in the Court's view warranted
immunity was that the program of restrictions
was never intended to operate by force of individual agreement or
combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from the leg-
islative command of the state and was not intended to operate or
become effective without that command. We find nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature.5
More recently, in California Retail Liquor' Dealers Ass'n v. Mid-
cal Aluminum, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court elaborated on the Parker
test for state action immunity. The Court held that to qualify for
immunity under Parker v. Brown, a challenged restraint or pro-
gram must be undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulated and af-
firmatively expressed state policy and must be actively supervised
by the state. Thus, the state action doctrine is neither limited to
unilateral action by the state nor is it so broad as to encompass all
anticompetitive restrictions authorized or permitted by a state.7
Parker's holding was based on the Court's interpretation of leg-
islative intent in the enactment of the Sherman Act and on a rec-
ognition of principles of comity inherent in a federal system of gov-
ernment. Finding no expressed purpose in the Act to control the
policies of state legislatures with regard to competition within their
borders, the Court was unwilling to read such a purpose into it:
In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution,
the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitution-
ally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nul-
lify a state's control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
5. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
6. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
7. The "state action" concept under Parker is much narrower than the state action con-
cept in, for example, the civil rights context, where it encompasses "individual action sup-
ported to some extent by state law or custom." Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579,
590 (1976).
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attributed to Congress.'
The state action doctrine is not founded on the principle that
the federal government has no power to regulate what states do
with regard to competition within their borders, since clearly Con-
gress' power under the commerce clause is broad. Rather, Parker
expresses the notion that in the Sherman Act Congress simply did
not intend to exercise that federal power so as to prohibit states
from deviating from the competitive norm established in the Act,
when a state deems such deviation to be appropriate as a matter of
state policy.
Since municipalities make most cable television franchising deci-
sions, the circumstances in which the state action doctrine of
Parker v. Brown might shield these decisions from exposure to an-
titrust scrutiny is a significant question. The emphasis in state ac-
tion cases, however, has always been as the state's action. In Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n,9 the Supreme Court refused to
immunize bar association minimum fee schedules because a gen-
eral grant of authority to supervise attorney conduct from the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court did not compel the adoption of a program of
price-fixing. The Court emphasized that "anticompetitive activities
must be compelled by direction of the State acting as sovereign.""
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,n, the Court refused to confer im-
munity on a lightbulb exchange program that had been ratified by
a state public utilities commission because the program was not
necessary to the accomplishment of the state's regulatory scheme."
The Court reaffirmed the principle that to be exempt, anticompeti-
tive activity must implement a statewide policy." In Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona," the Court explained that antitrust immunity ex-
ists when a policy requiring anticompetitive conduct is part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme that is clearly articulated, af-
firmatively expressed as state policy, and actively supervised by
the state as the policymaker."8 Again, in City of Lafayette v. Loui-
siana Power & Light Co.," the Court emphasized that for the state
8. 317 U.S. at 351.
9. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
10. Id. at 791.
11. 421 U.S. 579 (1976).
12. Id. at 595.
13. Id. at 585.
14. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
15. Id. at 362.
16. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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action immunity to exist it must be shown "that the legislature
contemplated the kind of action complained of." 7 Since the basis
of state action immunity was deference to state economic regula-
tion in a federal system of government, the conclusion that the im-
munity extends to all governmental units that derive their legisla-
tive powers directly from the state is not logically compelled.
Parker did not hold that Congress was without power to regulate
states' economic policies, but only that the Sherman Act was not
intended to do so.
Although the City of Lafayette decision rejected the argument
that Parker extends to all governmental entities," the municipal
defendants in that case owned the electric utilities that benefited
from the challenged municipal action. In his opinion concurring in
the plurality in City of Lafayette, Chief Justice Burger distin-
guished between "the proprietary enterprises of municipalities,""
and their "traditional government functions," 0 and considered
that Parker applied only to activities of the latter sort.2'
City of Lafayette thus arguably left open the question whether
municipalities engaged in the exercise of their traditional govern-
ment functions could be found to have violated the antitrust laws.
In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder2 2 the Su-
preme Court made it clear that the federal antitrust laws apply to
all municipal actions unless the municipality's action in fact con-
stitutes the action of the state itself or is in furtherance or imple-
mentation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy.23
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion in Community Communica-
17. Id. at 415. See also Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded sub rom., City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 911 (1979); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District, 557 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1977),
vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), reinstated on remand, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Pinehurst Airlines, Inc. v. Resort Air Services,
Inc., 476 F. Supp. 543 (N.D.N.C. 1979); Mason City Center Assocs. v. City of Mason City,
468 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Iowa 1979); United States v. Texas Board of Public Accountancy,
464 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Tex. 1978), afl'd per curiam, 592 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 925 (1979).
18. 435 U.S. at 408.
19. Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 424.
21. Id. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835, 840 n.13
(1982).
22. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S.Ct. 835 (1982).
23. Id. at 10.
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tions seems to suggest that different legal standards of liability
might apply to "governmental" municipal conduct than to private
conduct or commercial municipal conduct. Specifically, the Court
seemed to conclude that municipal liability in the governmental
context may hinge on proof of anticompetitive purpose rather than
on the usual requirement of proof of anticompetitive purpose or
effect." The Court also reserved the question "of remedies appro-
priate against municipal officials." 2 5
II.
The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
Whereas the Parker v. Brown immunity is based on the Su-
preme Court's reading of the Sherman Act in light of principles of
federalism and comity, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is based on
the Court's reading of the Act in light of the First Amendment
right to petition the government. In Eastern Railroad Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.," the case from which the
doctrine first developed, the Supreme Court held that the Sher-
man Act does not extend to concerted action by competitors to
influence legislation, even if the purpose of that concerted activity
is to encourage passage of legislation that restrains trade:
A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people
from taking a public position on matters in which they are
financially interesed would . .. deprive the government of a valu-
able source of information and, at the same time, deprive the peo-
ple of their right to petition in the very instances in which that
right may be of the most importance to them."
The Court distinguished between "business activity" and "political
activity," and construed the Sherman Act as regulating only the
former.2" Nevertheless, the Court observed that "a publicity cam-
paign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action,
[may be] a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than
an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor. . . ." In such a case the lobbying activity would not
be protected. In order for petitioning activity to be immune from
24. Id. at 15 n.20.
25. Id.
26. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
27. Id. at 139.
28. Id. at 137.
29. Id. at 144.
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antitrust scrutiny, the Court held that it must be "a genuine effort
to influence legislative and law enforcement practices."30 The other
case that gives the Noerr-Pennington doctrine its name is United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington." There the Supreme
Court held that "[j]oint efforts to influence public officials do not
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate com-
petition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as
part of a broader scheme. itself violative of the Sherman Act.""
In Noerr, the joint activity was an attempt to procure the pas-
sage of legislation; in Pennington, the joint activity was an attempt
to influence policy made by the executive branch of government,
specifically the Secretary of Labor. In California Motor Transport
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,33 the Supreme Court extended Noerr-
Pennington principles to joint activity in an adjudicatory context,
rather than limiting the doctrine to legislative or policy-making ac-
tivities. In California Motor Transport, plaintiff alleged that de-
fendant trucking companies jointly carried out a plan to oppose in
regulatory and judicial proceedings all applications for operating
rights filed by carriers seeking to compete with defendants.
It is -not clear from reading the cases in the Noerr-Pennington
line whether the doctrine is founded upon a reading of the Sher-
man Act or upon the application of First Amendment principles.
In Noerr, the Court suggested that the doctrine was based upon
the Court's construction of the Act,34 emphasizing that there was
no basis in the legislative history of the Act to impute to Congress
a purpose to regulate political activity. 5 In both California Motor
Transport and an earlier Noerr-Pennington case, Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.," the Court emphasized the
First Amendment basis of the Noerr-Pennington immunity.37 The
distinction could be significant, because the Court has indicated
that Congress has the power to regulate commercial speech" and
political lobbying activity.39 The view that the Noerr-Pennington
30. Id.
31. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32. Id. at 670.
33. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
34. 365 U.S. at 132 n.6.
35. Id. at 137.
36. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
37. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 510-11, 513-
14, 515; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. at 707.
38. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
39. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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doctrine is based on a determination that Congress did not intend
to regulate certain kinds of political or petitioning activity through
the Sherman Act could lead to a more expensive construction of
that antitrust exemption or immunity than the view that the doc-
trine is coextensive with the freedoms guaranteed by the First
Amendment. Since more recent cases, such as California Motor
Transport, rely heavily on a First Amendment analysis, the Court
appears headed toward the conclusion that the immunity afforded
by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is no broader than the protec-
tion required for preservation of First Amendment rights.'0
Whatever the basis for judicial recognition of the Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity, there are several types of situations to which
the immunity does not apply, some well-recognized and others dis-
puted. First, it is obvious that not all joint activity by competitors
is protected by Noerr-Pennington merely because some legitimate
petitioning activity is involved. Second, it is well recognized that
petitioning activity that is not legitimate or genuine is not pro-
tected by the doctrine, although the distinction between protected
and unprotected activity in this sense is problematic. Third, a
number of courts that have considered the issue have held that
when the government body petitioned, or some of its members, is a
participant in the conspiracy, the immunity does not apply.
Fourth, some courts have held that there is no Noerr-Pennington
immunity when the governmental body petitioned is acting in a
proprietary or commercial capacity as opposed to a governmental
one. Finally, a few courts have suggested that Noerr-Pennington
protection should be limited to petitioning activity that seeks an-
ticompetitive governmental action that would be immunized under
Parker v: Brown.
A. The Nature of the Activities Protected by No-
err-Pennington
In Noerr, the Supreme Court distinguished between "two or
more persons . . . associating together in an attempt to persuade
40. See, e.g., California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. at 513-15;
Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. at 456 ("Numerous examples could be cited of
communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as . . . the
exchange of price and production information among competitors. . . ."); accord, In re Air-
port Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,746, at p. 78,258 (N.D.
Cal.) ("[tlhe Court concludes . . . that the [Noerr-Pennington] doctrine represents a First
Amendment limitation on the scope of the Sherman Act").
No. 4] 651
COMM/ENT LAW JOURNAL
the legislature or the executive to take particular action with re-
spect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly" and
the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act,
combinations ordinarily characterized by an express or implied
agreement or understanding that the participants will jointly give
up their trade freedom, or help one another to take away the
trade freedom of others through the use of such devices as price-
fixing agreements, boycotts, market-division agreements, and
other similar arrangements."
In Pennington, the Court noted that:
Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the anti-
trust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such
conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader
scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act."'
The protection afforded by Noerr-Pennington extends only to pe-
titioning activities. It does not extend to a "broader scheme itself
violative of the Sherman Act." In Pennington, the Court specified
that the district court's error was in failing to instruct the jury that
it was not permitted to find an illegal conspiracy based solely on
petitioning activity or "in any event to attribute illegality to these
acts as part of a general plan to eliminate" defendants' competi-
tors. The Court also noted that even protected petitioning activi-
ties could be considered by the jury insofar as the activities might
tend "reasonably to show the purpose and character of the particu-
lar transactions under scrutiny."" Thus, the Court has recognized
that unprotected group action may be mixed with protected peti-
tioning activities, and the Noerr-Pennington protection afforded
the latter does not bar a finding of liability based on injury caused
by the former.
Precisely this point was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in Femi-
nist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad.45 That case in-
volved actions by hospital medical staffs and medical societies that
the plaintiffs claimed restrained trade or commerce. Briefly, the
plaintiff clinic depended upon the part-time assistance of physi-
cians who were drawn from the staffs of nearby hospitals. The hos-
pital staffs exerted pressure on their members not to affliliate
41. 365 U.S. at 136.
42. 381 U.S. at 670.
43. Id. (Emphasis added.)
44. Id. at n.3.
45. 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978).
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themselves with the clinic for reasons ostensibly having to do with
the clinic's professional standards, and the hospital staffs took or
threatened to take disciplinary action against doctors who did affil-
iate themselves with the clinic. As part of the campaign against the
clinic, the OB-GYN Committee at one of the hospitals wrote a let-
ter of complaint to the director of the Florida Board of Medical
Examiners (B.O.M.E.), a governmental body within the meaning of
Noerr. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguishing between
protected and unprotected activity, held that while the action of
the OB-GYN Committee "in reporting disciplinary findings and
suspected violations to the BOME may be petitioning activity
within the meaning of the First Amendment, communications
within those groups are not."" It seems to us that the Fifth Circuit
recognized that the pressure exerted on individual doctors by the
hospital staffs-"communications within those groups"-were sim-
ply concerted attempts by some of the members of the hospital
staffs to "help one another to take away the trade freedom of
others," 7 specifically, those doctors who attempted to affiliate
themselves with the clinic. That concerted activity also could be
viewed as what the Noerr Court described as "an express or im-
plied agreement or understanding that the participants [would]
jointly give up their trade freedom,"' the freedom to associate
with the plaintiff clinic should they so desire.
Although the distinction between protected petitioning activity
and unprotected activity is clear in theory, in practice the distinc-
tion can be difficult to apply. That is, if Noerr-Pennington re-
quires that competitors be allowed to join forces to support, pro-
pose, challenge, or otherwise affect legislation, must they not also
be permitted to agree amongst themselves on the particular form
of the legislation they prefer? Unfortunately, such agreements on
legislative proposals may involve, directly or indirectly, "the use of
such devices as price-fixing agreements, boycotts, market-division
agreements, and other similar arrangements" which are classic an-
titrust violations.' 9 The district court in United States v. Southern
Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.,50 framed the issue this way:
If the defendants may, in the exercise of their right to petition
46. 586 F.2d at 545.
47. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136.
48. Id.
49. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136 (footnote omitted).
50. 467 F. Supp. 471 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
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the government, jointly submit rate proposals to the state com-
missions, it would follow that they must be permitted to confer
and to formulate the rates they wish to propose. Just as a speaker
must be permitted to prepare his notes and determine what he
intends to say, so must the conferences be free to settle on the
specific relief or benefits they seek to obtain from the
commissions.5 1
The district court resolved this dilemma against the defendants,
basing its holding on "Justice Stevens' characterization [in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co."] of the regulatory process as a blend of
public and private decision-making [that] illustrates that the regu-
lated industry does not merely propose, but also decides."53 Ac-
cording to the Southern Motor court, the nature of the participa-
tion of those regulated in the regulatory decision-making process
suggested
that a court may properly accord independent significance to the
defendants' activities of rate formulation and proposal. First
Amendment law has always recognized that even an activity
which is itself communicative may nevertheless be penalized be-
cause of its nonspeech aspects. . . . Here, we agree with the gov-
ernment that the defendants' activities of collective rate formula-
tion constitute independently cognizable acts outside the scope of
First Amendment protection or the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.54
In the Houston cable television litigation," the evidence showed
that a group of applicants for franchises had agreed among them-
selves, without city involvement, on the boundaries of the territo-
ries for which they would seek franchises. The evidence also dis-
closed that the terms of the franchise ordinance that was
eventually adopted by the City Council were devised by the appli-
cants themselves with little or no participation by city officials.
The defendants argued that this conduct was necessarily protected
by Noerr-Pennington because it was a necessary ingredient of, or
predicate to, concerted petitioning activity by the franchise appli-
cants. The federal district court in Houston did not decide this is-
sue because it determined that city officials, including the mayor
and the City Council, were participants in the conspiracy and that
51. Id. at 485.
52. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
53. 467 F. Supp. at 485.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, No.H-79-1331 (S.D. Tex. filed July 7,
1981). The authors represent plaintiff in the case, which is now on appeal to the Fifth
Circuit.
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therefore Noerr-Pennington did not apply at all. It was plaintiff's
contention, however, that agreements between competing appli-
cants on the boundaries of the territories for which each would
seek a franchise are nothing more or less than classic cases of mar-
ket division, which the Noerr Court indicated was "essentially dis-
similar" to the kind of joint activity that Noerr protects. Similarly,
it could also be argued that the joint formulation of the franchise
ordinance by ostensibly competing applicants for franchises
amounted to .price-fixing, unprotected by .Noerr, since the ordi-
nance established rates, or prices, and other terms and conditions
of service.
B. The "Sham" Exception
The Noerr Court indicated that even those activities that appear
on the surface to constitute petitioning in one form or another are
not protected if they are "a mere sham to cover what is actually
noting more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor." 6 In Californid Motor Transport,
the Court emphasized that the sham exception to Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity also applies when the'petitioning occurs in an
adjudicatory context." The test for whether particular activity
constitutes genuine petitioning or is merely a sham, however, is not
the petitioner's intent to destroy a competitor' or produce an an-
ticompetitive result. Rather, the test is whether or not, without:r6-
gard to the petitioner's ultimate objective, he is genuinely exercis-
ing his right of access to, the government. The California Motor
Transport Court discussed the distinction in terms' of "abuse" of'
the petitioning process. In California Motor Tran.port the Court
reminded -the 'case for trial after the district court had dismissed
the plaintiffs -complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The
Court noted that the plaintiff's allegation was not that the defen-
dants sought to influence public 'officials to produce an anticompe;-
titive result, but that "they sought to, bar their competitors from
meaningful access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp tliat
decision-making process." 5 8 Several commentators, notably Areeda
and Turner, have suggested that the sham exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is, or ought to be, virtually impossible to in-
56. 365 U.S. at 144.
57. 404 U.S. at 512-13.
58. Id. at 512.
No. 4] 655
CoMm/ENT LAW JOURNAL
voke in the context of lobbying to produce a legislative result."
Because California Motor Transport's emphasis was on a purpose
to bar access to the tribunal, as opposed to a purpose to injure
competition or a competitor through action by a governmental tri-
bunal, Areeda and Turner's point is compelling, since it is hard to
imagine how petitioning activity could bar others' access to a legis-
lative body. It should not be forgotten, however, that the "sham"
exception was specifically referred to in Noerr, a case that involved
no adjudicatory or judicial process. In addition to what is com-
monly referred to as lobbying activity, however, Noerr also in-
volved a massive publicity campaign against the plaintiffs. Al-
though such conduct can obviously be construed as an attempt to
produce legislation by influencing the views of politicians' constitu-
encies, the Noerr Court was probably recognizing that as one
broadens the definition of petitioning activity in the context of at-
tempts to obtain or defeat legislation, the tactics employed may
bear less and less relationship to the political process and begin to
approach "what is actually nothing more than an attempt to inter-
fere directly with the business relationships of a competitor."60
Obviously, for petitioning activity of any sort to be actionable
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act," that activity must injure the
plaintiffs' business or property. In the context of legislation, that
injury would be a product of legislative action, and Areeda and
Turner make "the obvious point that a contention cannot, by defi-
nition, be frivolous [i.e., a sham] when it is actually adopted by a
legislature, administrator, or court." 2  Since cable television
franchising is a legislative matter, it is therefore unlikely that the
sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine would ever ap-
ply in that context if Areeda and Turner are correct. Cable televi-
sion franchise battles may often produce virulent campaigns in-
volving misleading information and misrepresentations. The Noerr
Court emphasized, however, that:
Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating
with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activ-
ities, a caution which has been reflected in the decisions of this
Court interpreting such legislation. All of this caution would go
for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to
59. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 203c (1978).
60. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
62. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 203c (1978) (footnote omitted).
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regulate activities of that nature simply because those activities
have a commercial impact and involve conduct that can be
termed unethical.63
The California Motor Transport Court recognized that there is a
greater willingness to penalize unethical conduct in an adjudica-
tory setting,6 " and lower courts have found antitrust violations in
unethical or improper petitioning activity before administrative
and judicial bodies.6 5
C. The Co-Conspirator Exception
An exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine that is, sadly,
more likely to apply in the political environment in which cable
television franchising occurs is the co-conspirator exception. Al-
though there are still dissenting judicial voices, the co-conspirator
exception to Noerr-Pennington is fairly well-established today. In
Parker v. Brown, the Court observed that "[w]e have [before us]
no question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant
in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of
trade."" Neither Noerr nor Pennington involved allegations that
the governmental body or official petition was a participant in the
conspiracy, and in fact the Supreme Court has never had occasion
to decide the question whether a government official's participa-
tion in a conspiracy eliminates Noerr-Pennington immunity for
petitioning activities directed to that official or the body of which
he is a member. In California Motor Transport, however, the
Court observed that "[clonspiracy with a licensing authority to
eliminate a competitor may also result in an antitrust transgres-
sion."67 In Pennington, the Court observed that "the [governmen-
tal] action taken to set a minimum wage for government purchases
of coal was the act of a public official who is not claimed to be a co-
conspirator."6 8
63. 365 U.S. at 141 (footnote omitted).
64. 404 U.S. at 512-13.
65. See, e.g., Israel v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., 466 F.2d 272, 274, 275-79 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(misrepresentation and suppression of information before an administrative agency); Sacra-
mento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Teamsters Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971)(use of threats and coercive measures to influence state fair offi-
cials); Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1298
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (filing false nomination forecasts with
state commission to reduce production allowables of other producers).
66. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
67. 404 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted).
68. 381 U.S. at 671.
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Lower courts have recognized the validity of the co-conspirator
exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, although there have
been a few dissenters. In Harman v. Valley National Bank,"9 the
Ninth Circuit held that Noerr did not necessarily bar relief when
the complaint alleged that the official petitioned, in that case the
Attorney General of California, was a participating conspirator."
In Duke & Co. v. Foerster" the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of the complaint, ruling that if the allegations of
the complaint were true, defendants were not entitled to immunity
under Noerr-Pennington. The court said that "[w]here the com-
plaint goes beyond mere allegations of official persuasion by an-
ticompetitive lobbying and claims official participation with pri-
vate individuals in a scheme to restrain trade, the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine is inapplicable."72 In Affiliated Capital Corp.
v. City of Houston,7 the court discussed at length the Noerr-Pen-
nington doctrine and the co-conspirator exception thereto. The
court held that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in not applicable
when the governmental body petitioned is a participant in the
conspiracy.
Some courts have had trouble applying Noerr-Pennington to the
specific facts of specific cases, with the result that distinctions be-
tween the various exceptions are sometimes blurred. When a plain-
tiff asserts the applicability -of the co-conspirator exception, he
may have an evidentiary problem in showing that the acts of gov-
ernment officials constituted participation in the conspiracy, rather
than merely support for its objects. For example, in Metro Cable
Co. v. CATV of Rockford,7 4 the court did not apply the co-conspir-
ator exception as was urged by plaintiff, saying that "[t]his is not a
case in which the agency of government itself is alleged to be a
part of the conspiracy, the question reserved in [Parker]."7 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that, even in light of plaintiff's allega-
69. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
70. Id. at 566.
71. 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975).
72. Id. at 1282; accord, Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District, 557 F.2d 580, 594
(7th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 992 (1978), reinstated, 583 F.2d 378 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979) ("[wle have some difficulty understanding how
a contract proposal to a governmental unit falls within the ambit of that right [to petition]
. . . but even if it does, we think it clear that agreement with government officials to pres-
sure others into an antitrust violation does not").
73. No. H-79-1331 (S.D. Tex. filed July 7, 1981). See note 47, supra.
74. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
75. Id. at 229.
658 [Vol. 3
ANTITRUST ISSUES IN CABLE FRANCHISING
tion that the mayor and aldermen had received substantial sums as
campaign contributions in exchange for their support, nothing in
Noerr or cases since Noerr suggested that Congress intended the
Sherman Act "to apply if a member of the legislative body agreed
to support" the legislative proposals of a conspiracy." Neverthe-
less, it seems reasonably clear that if participation can be proved,
courts will recognize the applicability of the co-conspirator excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington."
D. The Commercial-Governmental Capacity
Distinction
A fourth instance in which Noerr-Pennington may not apply is a
situation in which the governmental action that the defendants
seek to induce calls for the government to act in a commercial or
proprietary capacity rather than in a governmental capacity. Noerr
was largely based on the Court's belief that a construction of the
Sherman Act that interfered with the First Amendment right to
petition would impermissibly impute to Congress an attempt to
circumscribe this constitutional right.78 The Fifth Circuit has sug-
gested that "action designed to influence policy . . is all the
Noerr-Pennington rule seeks to protect."7 9
Other circuits have also found Noerr inapplicable in cases in
which defendants petitioned public officials engaged in purely
commercial dealings that were not matters of significant public
policy. The First Circuit addressed the issue in George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc.80 Plaintiff, a builder of
swimming pool facilities, charged that defendants conspired to in-
fluence public officials to adopt bidding specifications for construc-
tion of public swimming pools that were drafted to apply only to
pools constructed by defendants. The court reasoned that this type
of activity is not designed to influence governmental policy and
'76. Id. at 230.
77. But see Federal Prescription Service, Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 1981-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1i 64,217, at p. 73,846 n.1 ("[i]t seems doubtful that the existence of a
public co-conspirator would explain any result more satisfactorily than one of the estab-
lished exceptions to the Noerr doctrine"); Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influ-
ence Government Action, 45 U. CM. L. REV. 80, 115 (1977) ("in most cases the co-conspira-
tor exception is unworkable and should not be recognized").
78. 365 U.S. at 138.
79. Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1298
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
80. 424 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970).
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therefore does not implicate the interests protected by Noerr-Pen-
nington." The Court found support in the jurisprudence of the
First Amendment providing lesser protection for commercial
speech than political speech.82 The District of Columbia Circuit
used similar reasoning in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc."3 In that case,
a prospective purchaser of a professional football team charged
that the defendant football organizations and public stadium au-
thorities conspired to restrain trade and monopolize the business
of professional football by a covenant in a stadium lease prohibit-
ing use of a football stadium by any football team other than the
Washington Redskins. The Court found that Noerr-Pennington
only applied when the actions that were taken were designed to
influence state governmental policy rather than economic decisions
such as stadium leasing or procurement.
The "commercial speech" doctrine of First Amendment jurispru-
dence and the possible Noerr-Pennington "commercial activity"
exception should not be confused. In all cases in which the Noerr-
Pennington issue arises, the speech involved is likely to be com-
mercial in the sense that it is motivated by the speaker's pecuniary
interest. Prior to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,8" "commercial speech" was
largely unprotected by the First Amendment." In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, however, the Supreme Court announced that
restrictions on commercial speech could not automatically escape
First Amendment scrutiny, recognizing that some forms of com-
mercial speech are a necessary adjunct to the free flow of informa-
tion needed to make the free enterprise system work. Nevertheless,
the Court made it clear that in so holding it did not condemn re-
strictions on the time, place, and manner of commercial speech,"
and also noted that commercial speech soliciting illegal transac-
tions is not permitted.87 More recently, the Supreme Court ob-
served that "we . . . have afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position
in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of non-com-
81. Id. at 31-33.
82. Id. at 33.
83. 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
84. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
85. See generally id. at 758-76.
86. Id. at 771.
87. Id. at 772.
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mercial expression."8
Unlike commercial speech First Amendment cases, however, the
focus of the commercial/governmental distinction with reference to
Noerr-Pennington is not on the motivation of the speaker but on
the capacity in which the governmental body petitioned is acting.
The Supreme Court has indicated that special circumstances relat-
ing to the context in which speech occurs may justify restrictions
that might otherwise be thought to infringe on First Amendment
values. The federal labor laws impose restrictions on speech in the
context of labor disputes, for example.8 Moreover, there can be no
doubt that laws regulating the manner of lobbying activity are con-
stitutional even though their existence chills speech to some ex-
tent.90 The commercial activity exception to Noerr-Pennington re-
quires courts to examine the context in which petitioning activity
occurs and to analyze that context to determine whether the peti-
tioner seeks to influence governmental policy or to influence
choices by the government directly related to commercial transac-
tions in which the government has a significant role. Although the
dividing line between these two government roles is not always a
clear one, when the government is functioning as a commercial
entity there is less reason to exempt joint efforts to influence gov-
ernment action from Sherman Act liability. When the government
is making individualized commercial decisions in which it has a
financial stake, collusive or coercive behavior by other parties to
the transaction produces the same evils as it does in private sector
transactions. At the same time, the government's need for informa-
tion-a basis for a constitutional right to petition-can and should
be satisfied in the same way and on the same terms as are the
information needs of other commercial entities in the context of
commercial transactions.
At least one court has examined the Noerr-Pennington line of
cases and determined that there is no "commercial activity" excep-
tion to the doctrine. 1 That court misconceived the argument for
the commercial activity exception to Noerr-Pennington, however.
The court, in analyzing the Noerr line of cases, observed that all of
88. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
89. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. at 763 n.17.
90. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
91. In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) i 63,983, at p.
76,092 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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them had to do with the defendants' commercial interests." It fo-
cused on the nature of the speech, rather than on the capacity in
which the government was acting, and recognized that commercial
speech is also entitled to First Amendment protection. Our point is
not that such communications are entitled to less protection be-
cause they constitute commercial speech, but rather that when the
government is acting primarily as a commercial entity it is disin-
genuous to argue that the Constitution requires exemption from
the Sherman Act of the activities of private commercial entities
seeking to enter into commercial transactions with or through that
public commercial entity.
Cable television franchising decisions fall into an intermediate
area between commercial or proprietary activities by the govern-
ment and governmental or political activities by the government.
These decisions obviously involve municipalities in policy deci-
sions, and they are not classic cases of government purchasing.
However, franchise ordinances typically determine the minimum
required level of services that a cable operator has to provide, dic-
tate prices or maximum prices that cable operators may charge,
and determine the revenue that the cable operator must deliver to
the city. Once the franchises are awarded, the ultimate purchaser,
the citizen, has little or no imput into what prices may be charged
and what services are required. The citizen will have no opportu-
nity to choose the cable operator with whom he will deal. In short,
in passing franchise ordinances and awarding franchises, the city
operates like a. purchasing agent on behalf of all citizens. In this
sense, at least, the award of a franchise is little different from the
award of a contract, and accordingly there is a sound argument
that cable television franchise decisions by municipalities should
be considered commercial, rather than governmental.
E. Limitation of Noerr-Pennington to Efforts to In-
fluence Governmental Action that Would be Immune
under Parker v. Brown
Noerr-Pennington may not apply where the government action
sought to be induced is not immune under Parker v. Brown. In
Noerr, the Supreme Court observed that "where a restraint upon
trade . . . is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to
92. Id.
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private action, no violation of the Act can be made out."93 Further,
the reasoning in Noerr indicates that the Court recognized the in-
terplay between the government's right to represent the people
and the concomitant need to receive information from its constitu-
ency, and the people's right freely to inform the government of
their wishes.94 Thus, Noerr was based not only on First Amend-
ment considerations, but also on the concept, confirmed in Parker,
that the Sherman Act was intended to regulate business, not
politics.
In Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District," the Seventh
Circuit made a similar point when it noted that the involvement of
public officials in an illegal agreement "reduces the applicability of
the reasoning of Noerr to the degree it is based on the need of
governmental units for citizen input in making decisions that
Parker holds to be outside the scope of the Sherman Act."" Prior
to Kurek, the Seventh Circuit had said in Metro Cable Co. v.
CATV of Rockford, Inc.9 7 that "[s]ince the governmental actions of
the city council and its committees were not themselves subject to
the Sherman Act, the same was true under Noerr of concerted ef-
forts to induce those governmental actions. . . ."
Certainly it makes good sense to predicate the availability of No-
err-Pennington immunity on the existence of valid state action
that is immune from the antitrust laws. It is difficult to imagine
what First Amendment values deserve protection in the case of in-
ducement of illegal governmental action. It could be argued, how-
ever, that making Noerr-Pennington immunity dependent upon a
finding of immunity under Parker would substantially chill the ex-
ercise of First Amendment rights inasmuch as there may be uncer-
tainty whether Parker is applicable to a particular situation. In
Harman v. Valley National Bank,99 the court observed that
making
Sherman Act liability depend upon ultimate resolution of often
difficult questions of law and fact relating to the validity or pro-
priety of solicited governmental action 'would substantially im-
pair the power of government to take actions through its legisla-
93. 365 U.S. at 136 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 137 & n.17.
95. See note 63, supra.
96. 557 F.2d at 593.
97. 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975).
98. Id. at 229.
99. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
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ture and executive that operate to restrain trade' and 'would raise
important constitutional questions'. . . .1oo
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has observed that, because of the
financial incentives of commercial speakers, commercial speech is
often "hardier" than political speech, and accordingly has retained
a distinction between the two.101 Thus, it is reasonable to suggest
that the Court might be inclined to limit Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity to situations in which the governmental action would be im-
mune under Parker v. Brown, notwithstanding the greater poten-
tial for chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights.10 2
Two recent district court opinions explicitly state that the No-
err-Pennington privilege should only be available when the action
complained of induces governmental action protected by Parker v.
Brown. In Huron Valley Hospital, Inc. v. City of Pontiac,10 3 the
court stated "Noerr-Pennington immunity presupposes Parker v.
Brown immunity."10 This reasoning was elaborated in In re Air-
port Car Rental Antitrust Litigation.o' The court there noted:
[Wihenever possible, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be
applied in a manner that is consistent with Parker; that is, the
courts should be reluctant to extend immunity to private parties
who have sought to influence government activity that would not
be protected under the state action doctrine.00
The court in that case noted the anomalous results that would oc-
cur if Noerr-Pennington immunized actions by private parties to
influence governmental actions that themselves would not be im-
mune under the antitrust laws. The court concluded that "[w]hile
it is true that Noerr-Pennington and Parker v. Brown are legal
doctrines rooted in very separate principles-the right to petition
versus sovereign immunity and the federalism-the Court feels
constrained to consider their practical interrelation in order to
avoid potentially inequitable or anomalous results."10 7 In a subse-
quent opinion in the same case, however, a different district court
100. Id. at 566 (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137-38).
101. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977); Linmark As-
socs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977); Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 & n.24 (1976).
102. See also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954).
103. 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,520 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
104. Id. at p. 77,008.
105. 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,746 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
106. Id. at p. 78,264.
107. Id. at p. 78,262.
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judge expressed severe reservations to that analysis. 0e
III.
Conclusion
If one thing is clear, it is that Noerr-Pennington and Parker v.
Brown are doctrines whose scope and content are as yet unclear.
The issues discussed in this article will prove to be particularly im-
portant in cable television litigation because the award of
franchises always involves a governmental unit, always involves in-
tensive rivalry, and always involves much money. Wherever there
is an opportunity for money to be made, businesses will pursue
that opportunity vigorously, and it is an unfortunate fact of life
that these pursuits are not always legally conducted. The intersec-
tion of business and politics is particularly clear in the award of
cable television franchises. Municipalities often express the desire
for local input or control of cable television systems, and therefore
prominent local citizens are often involved in franchise applica-
tions, either as figureheads or as actual operators. These citizens,
one of whose selling points is their strong ties to the community,
quite often also have a correlatively strong tie to the community's
local politicians. Thus, there is often a danger that the franchise
award process will be subverted, and that city councils and other
local government bodies will forget their primary duty to their con-
stituencies and cleave instead to those whose financial support has
in the past contributed most to their political power. For this rea-
son, losers in the political competition for an award of a cable tele-
vision franchise may often have good reason to believe that their
defeat was not by reason of a legislative decision on the merits, but
instead came about through manipulation and abuse of political
processes. Often, these situations will reflect nothing except bad
government. In some cases, however, antitrust violations may have
contributed to the injury, and in those cases a clear understanding
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is essential to the successful
prosecution of a lawsuit.
108. See, In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11
63,983, pp. 76,097-99 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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